We clearly see on some cameras in the street that it took less than 1 minute for the thief to take it.
I was not aware that the "replay" attack (as I understand consists simply in listening to my keys signal through my door and replicating it to open and start the car), so my key was not far at all.
So my question is, why is my worthless github account secured by a free android 2FA app which makes replicating attacks impossible, and my 50K€ car secured by the dumbest only-one-forever-the-same key ever?
Is it not possible in the car keys to make some pgpsign-like technology?
(Also I am now aware of the tiktok trend of stealing these Kia and Hyundai car because their security is so easy to abuse)
I thought normal replay attacks are solved and the issue here is more to do to forward they key range close to the car to simulate the car.key being close.
That's what I can't easily just solve if not needing a button on the key which defeats the purpose of the said feature
How complex would a device have to be to not be trivially defeated by a replay attack? How do you get both ends to reliably communicate without requiring an always-on internet connection in both the dongle and the vehicle to sync timing or some other state? What do you do when the manufacturer no longer exists or doesn't want to pay for servers to enable people to drive "old models"?
My car is cheap and doesn't have a wireless key.