I am thinking about how the US detonated its Hiroshima nuke about 45 seconds after dropping it from the plane, and how it was detonated, as designed I believe, about 1/3 mile above Hiroshima.
In the 80s a Titan 2 ICBM in the south actually exploded in its silo from a fuel mishap. The missile had a full hydrogen bomb on board and it was blown out of the silo and into a nearby field, still intact and unexploded. So in practice we've seen there's low risk for an unintended chain reaction. This is a great documentary on the incident: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/command-an...
- some will explode in the mid air with full force
- some will explode in the mid air with reduced force
- some will disassemble on the intercept and won’t explode at all
- some will fall to the ground and explode with variety level of force
- some will fall and won’t explode at all
- some will fall to the seas and rivers and may explode much later and make all other kinds of problems
Successfully intercepted ballistic missiles on the final phase will arrive very close to the target, so chances for it to cause damage are much higher.
In all of these cases, a successful intercept will happen tens if not thousands of kilometers from the target.
A boost phase interception would happen above the launch area. A midcourse intercept would essentially happen in space and a terminal intercept would happen at the edge of the atmosphere.
I'd recommend reading about Aegis, THAAD and GMD. Also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballistic_missile_flight_phase...
Of course there are also stealth bombers and cruise missiles. In the case of stealth bombers, you either shoot them before the bombs are dropped or you don't (Barring some extremely conveniently located point defenses, like C-RAM)
Cruise missiles? Shot down by conventional air defenses hundreds of kilometers from the target if terrain allows.
Hypersonic cruise missiles? Maybe shot down by conventional air defenses.
1 - https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/303337/command-and-...
Scenario II: Your defenses knocked out the warhead's delivery system, but did not damage the actual (small, tough) nuclear warhead or its control systems badly enough to disable those. My bet is that the standard design spec. is "when fully armed and near-ish to the target(s), if a critical failure occurs in the delivery system, then detonate immediately". Hopefully your missile defenses intercepted it far, far away from anything that you care much about.
https://youtu.be/uY-u1qyRM5w?t=2800
Anyway the original bomb had a lot of detonators all around that needed to be fired right. Modern ones have only two, from the little I've seen in published imagery.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pit_%28nuclear_weapon%29#Safet...
One hopes this is arranged so simultaneous firing of both detonators results in a fizzle, and a precise stagger is needed. Either way though, an external explosive force will just disassemble the thing, not cause it to go off.
Generally you need to create sufficient neutron flow of neutrons of very specific energy to start fission chain reaction. This happens by bringing more of the fissile material together - more neutrons cause more fissile reactions, leading to more neutrons-boom. An explosive fission will push matter away. If you create an explosion that parts the fissile material before most of the nuclei have split, it’s a dud. To get a really high yield you have to shape the geometry of the fissile material very precisely at a very specific moment so that most of the nuclei get flow of neutrons at exactly correct energy. It does not suffice to bring heat to nuclear material, or just lump it randomly together, you need to be very precise so that there is enough of the fissile at the right place at the right time.
The non-nuclear detonators explosives in nukes serve two purposes: push the fissile material together fast enough, and shape the fissile material just-so due to the pressure effect. It’s really, really inmprobable to trigger the nuke by a random explosion other than the trigger one.
Like, some designs were “one point unsafe”, but could be this exploited deliberately as counter-ABM protection? Or: we know that there were many efforts to allow nuclear warheads to detonate simultaneously and close to each other (so neutron flux from earlier detonations would not disrupt other devices’ firing sequences), but how exactly it relates to ABM protection? And so on and so on.
Exact solutions are classified, and what we can learn from unclassified sources is mostly a speculation.
Bare in mind that no one has actually managed to intercept
Lots of references in there, some seem to answer your question.