I think this might have something to do with oAuth, but I see this behavior on websites that don't use any common account infrastructure.
Ultimately, I have two questions for web designers and UI/UX folks. What is the name of this pattern? And, does it bring any benefits or is it just a trendy thing to do?
1. "Single Sign-On"/Multi-Provider support where the email is used as a lookup key for which Provider to use to log in (redirecting to corporate SAML providers or things like that). (Mentioned by most of the other commenters here.)
2. Another "Wish It Were Multi-Factor" process that (mostly American) Banks cooked up to meet regulatory wording at available loopholes rather than address regulatory intent/spirit (real Two-Factor/Multi-Factor support), in this case specifically for phishing protection. That (dumb) idea was that the user in application settings would pick a recognizable "callback" such as a photo of a cute animal and a word they'd notice. Upon entering the username and before entering the password the application would display this "callback" and in theory the user would remember and know better than to enter their password if they saw the wrong "callback" photo/word. In practice I think we all realize that humans do things like username/password login generally by rote muscle memory, aren't likely to stop and "check the cute animal photo" first, and that whatever APIs returned the "callbacks" would be easily scrapable for phishing anyway if the only real input to them was email address (and maybe a rate limit). At least in my experience most of the sites that did this "cute animal wish it were phishing protection" have since dropped the "cute animal" callbacks (because they were silly), but kept the separate username then password flows. It's easy to assume that that's just laziness on their part after they did all that work to separate the flow that they would not be quick to merge it back together.
The site looks up the supplied email and decides where to send the user - if they have a password, ask them for it; otherwise send them to their identity provider to authenticate and sign them in at the end of that process.
This does leak a little bit of information about users - a third-party could observe whether "bob@megacorp.co" gets redirected to Megacorp's SAML server or gets a password prompt.
Note that I have used the words "authentication" and "credentials" and purposefully omitted "passwords". That's because passwords are just one way of authenticating users. You could also authenticate users by sending a code by email or SMS or using a client certificate, among other ways.
An example: your company subscribes to Office365 but wants to manage your credentials to provide you a single sign on experience across systems. When you visit outlook.office.com to check your email, Microsoft has no idea who you are or that you need to be authenticated by your company. So it asks you to enter your email address, and on getting that, it knows (based on prior configuration) that your company's domain requires you to be sent to a specific page managed by your company for authentication (of course, your company may have outsourced that function to another provider, in which case you get redirected there). In this setup, Microsoft does not know or care how you get authenticated. It just needs a secure and valid authentication token back from the system that's going to authenticate you.
Depending on the systems and providers in question, the most common underlying technologies would either be OAuth or SAML.